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No. 76-682
Timely
Cert to CA 10
(Barrett, Doyle
& DJ Stanley)
Federal/Civil
The question is whether a tribal membership
ordinance, which provides that children of a "mixed"
marriage between a tribal member and a nonmember shall
be members if the father is a member but not if the

------------

11

mother is a member, -

violates the equal protection

~ -- .~
~

- 2 -

and due process provisions of the Indian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
1.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW:

Petr is an Indian

tribe with recognized powers of self-government.

Its

membership ordinance was adopted by the Tribal Council in
1939 in response to a marked increase in marriages between
Pueblo members and nonmembers.

Prior to the enactment of

the ordinance, membership in the Pueblo for children of
mixed marriages had been determined on an individual basis.
Resps are a female member of the Pueblo, married to
a nonmember, and her child barred from membership because of
the ordinance.

'

Resps sued the Pueblo and its governor on

behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging
that the ordinance deprives children of female line mixed
marriages of certain political, land use, and residential

2/

rights -

enjoyed by tribal members, in violation of_ the

provision in the Indian Civil Rights Act that "No Indian tribe
in exercising its powers of self-government shall • • • deny
to any person within its jt·. risdiction the equal protection of
the laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without
due process of law."

II

25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).

These rights include the right to vote in tribal elections,
to hold tribal office, to inherit possessory interestsin tribal
land, and to continue living in the Pueblo after the death of
the parent who is a member. Lack of membership does not affect
federal benefits accorded Indians generally.

- 3 The DC (D. N. Mex.) (Mechem) found jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343(4), on the ground that the action
here was one brought under an Act of Congress [25 U.S.C.
§ 1302] "providing for the protection of civil rights."
That Act also waived sovereign immunity.

The court went

on to uphold the membership ordinance under§ 1302(8), the
equal protection provision of the Act.

It reasoned that

Congress did not intend for the equal protection standard
of the Indian Civil Rights Act to be as stringent as that
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the standard under
the Act does not invalidate traditional membership criteria.
The court did not find that this particular discrimination
against female line mixed marriages embodied a traditional
.membership rule, but did find it rooted in the traditional
patrilinear and patrilocal organization of Pueblo society.
CA 10 reversed, agreeing with the DC that § 1302(8)
is not coterminous with the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and that Congress intended for the courts
t~e

t~ eigh

importance of tribal custom and cultural identity in ap-

plying the statute.

However, CA 10 pointed out that Congress

chose to include some constitutional provisions in the Act
(free speech, the Fourth through Eighth Amendments, and equal
protection) while excluding others (the Fifteenth Amendment
and the establishment clause) out of a concern for tribal
cultural identity; thus Congress had already performed some of
the balancing of individual liberties against tribal traditions

- 4 when it included the equal protection guarantee in the
Act.

The court found that the Pueblo had not shown how

the discrimination here fosters the tribe's cultural
survival, noting that the plaintiff child here was reared
at the Pueblo, spoke the tribal language, practiced the
tribal religion -- and hence in a cultural sense was a
tribal member.

The court thought · that the Pueblo could

have adopted means other than the instant sex discrimination
to preserve the patrilinear tradition in the tribe and to
deal with the economic problems posed by the increase in
membership attributable to mixed marriages.

The court

distinguJ.8'Sed several CA decisions upholding a quantum of

{ .

Indian blood as a

~
for tribal membership or office-

criter~.

ik

holding, because ofAimportance of those qualifications in
maintaining the "integrity" of tribal membership.
2.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs argue that the Act did not

intend to waive the tribe's sovereign immunity, that the
equal protection clause of the Act requires only that tribal
membership rules be administered evenly, and that

~he

instant

discrimination is necessary for the cultural survival of the
tribe.
3.

DISCUSSION:

I think the decision below is

correct and consistent with the law in other circuits.
Q..

There areAresponse• and amici briefs in support of
cert from several Indian tribes.

1/12/77
ME

Spiegel

CA, DC opinions in
petn.

APPENDIX

THE 1939

ORDINA-NCE

December 15, 1939
Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo of
Santa Clara, New :Mexico, in regular meeting duly
assembled, that hereafter the following rules shall
govern the admission to membership to the Santa
Clara Pueblo:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
» ... ,...i!!ll ..
2. All children born of marriages between male
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and nonmembers shall be members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and nonmembers shall not be membe.rs of the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be natura ized as members
of the Santa Clara Pueblo under any circumstances.
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September 20, 1977

No. 76-682 Santa Clara Pueblo, et al v. Martinez, et al
This memorandum will merely identify the issues, as an
aid to memory, and will venture no analysis.

As I dictate

this, I have not looked at the cert memo - which is probably a
far better summary than I will undertake at this time.
Santa Clara Pueblo (Tribe) is an Indian tribe of some
1,200 members.

It claims a lineage of "at least 700 years as a

distinct cultural group".

It has been at its present location

on the Rio Grande River for some 300 years.

The Tribe is based

on an official Indian Reservation "with sovereign powers of
self government", with a written constitution, a council and a
president.
In 1939, and as a response to a marked increase in
marriages between tribal members and nonmembers, the Pueblo
Tribe Council adopted an ordinance that distinguished between
marriages by male members o( the tribe and marriages by female
members.

The ordinance grants tribal membership to "all

children born of marriages between male members
non-members .

"

. and

But it precludes membership for "children

born of marriages between female members . . . and non-members".

2.

In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act,
28

u.s.c.

§ 1308(3).

Subsection (8) of§ 1302 provides:

No Indian tribe in exercising its powers of self
government shall
(8) Deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of
liberty or property without due process of law.
The named respondent, Julia Martinez, a member of the
tribe, married a Navaho who is not a member.

Their eight

children have been reared within the reservation, speak the
Tewa language of the tribe, practice the traditional religion,
and - according to CAlO - "the Martinez children are,
culturally, members of the Pueblo".
But by virtue of the 1939 tribal ordinance, the
children are barred from membership.

This results

~

~

their

being deprived of various substantial rights, including those
of voting, holding secular office, and "sharing the material
benefits of Pueblo membership".
Children of a mixed marriage, where the father is a
tribal member and the mother is not, are entitled to full
membership and enjoyment of all tribal rights.

This

discrimination based on the sex of the parent would be invalid
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The substantive question is whether it also is violative of
subsection (8) of the 1968 Act.

3.
Jurisdictional and Immunity Issues
1.

The first question is whether federal courts have

jurisidction under 28

u.s.c.

violation of the Act of 1968?

1343(4) over suits alleging
Both the DC and CAlO held that

federal jurisdiction exists where - as here - action is brought
under an Act of Congress.

Both courts below also agreed that

to the extent that the Act of 196 8 is applicable, tribal
immunity is thereby waived or limited.

These holdings are

strongly challenged by petitioner, in the briefs of several of
the amici 1 and the SG's memorandum of April 26 indicates that
the questions of jurisdiction and immunity are serious ones.
The Act of 1968 contains no specific grant of jurisdiction or
any express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.
Although I am not at rest, I am inclined to agree with
the courts below.

This case invokes an Act of Congress which

should be sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

And if

sovereign immunity could be pled against the Act of 1968, a
substantial part of its purpose could thereby be frustrated.
The briefs indicate that the four circuit courts of
appeals that have considered the jurisdictional and immunity
questions agree with CAlO.

Merits
Respondent's brief makes a rather convincing showing,
based on the legislative history and particularly the report

4.
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (brief 13), that the Act of
1968 was intended to guarantee substantially the same rights as
those of the U.S. Bill of Rights.

Respondents agree, however,

that although the legal standards of

§

1302(8) should be the

same as those of the Fourteenth Amendment, application of these
standards must be made in the context of "an Indian tribe with
distinct cultural traditions and social organization" that
differ from the states to which the Fourteenth Amendment
applies.

This difference concerns identification of the

purpose served by the ordinance and a judgment as to whether it
is legitimate.

~

Respondent agrees that the purpose of
~

preserving racial and cultural and racial identity is
legitimate, but they deny that the purposes are rationally
served by the ordinance.

They point out that "male-line

children of half or less Indian ancestry, raised away from the
Pueblo, knowing nothing of its language, culture, religion or
traditions," automatically become tribal members whereas
persons such as the children of Audrey Martinez who are
culturally members of the tribe in every respect are denied
legal membership.
CAlO appears to have applied the compelling state
interest standard (Pet. 43a), one that a majority of the Court
has never applied to a sex discrimination case.
contend that the rational basis test is the

Petitioners

app~iate

standard, and as I read respondents' brief they are willing
(

5.

to stand or fall on the "middle-tier" test of Craig v. Boren
(br. 28):

whether the classification on the basis of gender

serves "important governmental objectives and [is]
substantially related to achievement of those objectives".
Petrs' brief is particularly strong in supporting the
legitimacy of the tribal interest.

It also argues that the

1939 ordinance "is simply a written emobiment of preexisting
unwritten rule of membership that has been in existence from
time immemorial".

Brief 9.

It is also argued with a good deal

.v

of reason - and I bel1ee authority that I have not checked that both Congress and the federal courts should leave

1r

determination of tribal membership to trial law.*
A

I terminate my dictation at this point inconclusively.

The SG has not yet filed his brief.

Based on

the April memo, I would expect the SG to urge reversal on one
or even all of the three principal issues.

There is a fourth

issue latent in the case, namely, whether this suit could be
maintained against the President of the tribe individually
without regard to tribal immunity.

I rather doubt, however,

whether we reach this issue.
I view the case on the merits as quite close.

The

b

preservation of trial and cultural identity could best be

A.
*This argument has a good deal of surface appeal. But if
membership in the tribe determines whether one enjoys, or does
not enjoy, the basic rights apparently sought to be protected
by the Act of 1968, the argument loses much of its force.

6.

preserved on a case-by-case basis without regard to the sex of
the parent.

This, however, could well result in manipulation

and discrimination.

Another alternative would be to provide

that the children of a "non-tribal"marriage would always be
denied membership without regard to the sex of the tribal
parent.

This would have the objection, however, of diluting

the strength of an already weakened tribe.

These thoughts

suggest that the 1939 ordinance is not as wholly irrational as
it seems to be on its face.
I will await further briefing, discussing with my
clerk, the oral argument - and in all probability - will go to
the Conference and await the views of my colleagues who profess
to be Indian law experts, notably White and Rehnquist.

L.F.P., Jr.

~~()
ss

between a woman who is a member of the tribe and a man who is
not, but that mandates membership for children of marriages
between a man who is a member of the tribe and a woman who is
not, violates the "equal protection" provision of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §1302(8).

It also pres·e nts

the preliminary questions whether the DC had jurisdiction to

entertain a suit for the vindication of individual rights under
the Indian Civil Rights Act;

and whether the suit was barred

by the sovereign immunity of the tribe.
I. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW.
The named plaintiffs are Julia Martinez and her daughter
Audrey Martinez.

Julia is a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo

tribe ("Pueblo") and is married to a Navajo Indian who is not
a member of the Pueblo.

Julia and her husband have lived on

the Pueblo reservation since their marriage in 1941, and Audrey
and their other children speak the Pueblo language, participate
in the Pueblo religion, and live on the Pueblo reservation. Since 1946,
Julia has tried repeatedly to enroll her children as members of
the Pueblo, without success.

Denial of membership prevents the

children from voting for or holding tribal office, and it prevents
their mother from passing her house on the reservation and lands
in which she has a possessory interest on to the children.
The Pueblo tribe, which has occupied lands near Sante Fe,
New Mexico for s·ome 300 years, organized and adopted a constitution
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25
1935.

u.s.c.

§476, in

Art.II, §1 of the 1935 Constitution provides that children

of parents both of whom are members of the Pueblo shall be members
of the Pueblo; and that, "All children of mixed marriages between
members of the Santa Clara pueblo and nonmembers [shall be
members], provided such children have been recognized and adopted
by the [tribal] council." App.2.

Prior to 1939, children of

marriages between women who were members of the Pueblo and men who

were not were admitted to membership in the Pueblo on a
case-by-case basis.
In 1939 the tribal council of the Pueblo, which exercises
both legislative and judicial power and is elected by all members

-

of the tribe over age 18, enacted the ordinance that is at issue
here.

It provides:

...

1. All children born of marriages between members
of the Santa Clara Pueblo shall be members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
2. That children born of marriages between male
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall
be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo .
3. Children of marriages between female members of
the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members
of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of
the Santa Clara Pueblo under any circumstances.
Since this ordinance was enacted, no children of marriages
between women who are members of the Pueblo and men who are not
have been made members of the Pueblo.
The named plaintiffs brought this suit in the DC alleging
that enforcement of sections 2 and 3 of the ordinance deprived
them and members of their class of rights under 25 U.S.C. §1302(8),
which provides:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall -

.

(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of
liberty or property without due process of law; . • •
The suit named as defendants the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe and
its elected governor in his individual and official capacity.

Jurisdiction was asserted under 28

u.s.c.

§1343(4), which provides:

The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced
by any person • • •
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or
other relief under any Act of Congress providing for
the protection of Civil Rights, including the right to
vote.
The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but not damages.
The DC denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, relying on cases from three other circuits to
establish that jurisdiction was proper under §1343(4) and that
sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. E.g., Crowe v. Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231 (CA4 1974); Laramie v.
Nicholson, 487 F.2d 315 (CA9 1973); Daly v. United States,
483 F.2d 700 (CAB 1973).

It held that if exhaustion of tribal

remedies was a prerequisite of suit under the Indian Civil Rights
Act, plaintiffs had satisfied that requirement.
After trial on the merits, the DC filed an opinion that
constituted its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The

court stated that defendants had "sought to prove that the [1939]
Ordinance was merely the written embodiment of ancient custom, or
alternatively, that the Ord i nance regulated membership for
religious as well as secular purposes." Pet.App. at 2la.

The

court found that the ordinance did not regulate membership for
religious purposes, noting that Audrey Martinez (the daughter)
was allowed to participate in the Pueblo religion as fully as
if she were a member of the Pueblo.

The court thought it was

"less clear" whether the ordinance was "an embodiment of

pre-existing ancient Pueblo culture."

On one hand, no

fixed rule had been enforced before 1939 with regard to children
of mixed marriages, and "In that sense, the establishment of
any rule must be seen as a break with tradition."

But:

On the other hand, the criteria employed in classifying
children of mixed marriage .as members or non-members are rooted in certain traditional values. It appears
that Santa Clara was traditionally patrilineal and
patrilocal - in other words, that kinship, name and
location of residence were expected to follow the male
rather than the female line. These cultural expectations
have lost much of their force, but they are not entirely
vitiated. The absentee voter lists of the Pueblo show that
in 1971, 148 members of the Pueblo lived elsewhere. Of these,
59 were men and 89 were women. In 1973, 143 members lived
elsewhere, of whom 59 were men and 84 were women.
Turning to the legal issue, the DC said that other courts
'~ave

consistently held that the equal protection guarantee of

the Indian Civil Rights Act is not identical to the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. [cites] Instead, the Act and its
equal protection guarantee must be read against the background of
tribal sovereignty and interpreted within the context of tribal
law and custom."

At a minimum, §1302(8) "requires that existing

tribal law be applied with an even hand."

And where tribes have

departed from traditional methods of choosing leaders, the courts
have imposed one man-one vote requirements under §1302(8).

But,

the court thought,q§l302(8) should not be construed in a manner
that would invalidate a tribal membership ordinance when the
classification attacked is one based on criteria that have been
traditionally employed by the tribe in considering membership
questions."

Plaintiffs and defendants agree that the Indian

Civil Rights Act should not be - constrited .. so as to destroy the

tribe's cultural identity, but plaintiffs , argue the ordinance does
not rationally further preservation of cultural identity because
it bars childrn like Audrey, who culturally is a Pueblo, from
membership while admitting other children who culturally are not
Pueblos.

But, "Even assuming plaintiffs are correct, the Equal

Protection guarantee of the Indian Civil Rights Act should
not be constr ued in a manner which would require or authorize
this Court to determine which traditional values will promote
cultural survival and therefore should be preserved and which
of them are inimical to cultural survival and should therefore
be abrogated."

That is a decision only the Pueblo can make.

On appeal, CA 10 agreed that the DC had jurisdiction and that
sovereign immunity did not bar the suit. It disagreed, however,
with the conclusion
/that the ordinance did not violate §1302(8). CA 10 first reviewed
the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act.

It

originated as a bill that provided Indian tribes were subject to
all the requirements of the Bill of Rights and other pertinent
constitutional provisions.

In response to protests that the bill

would cut too deeply into traditional Indian culture, the Senate
subcommittee rewrote the bill to delete its version of the
non-establishment clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.

At the

same time, it retained the guarantee of free exercise of religion
over tribal protests.

Thus, Congress was aware of the need to

balance individuals' rights against tribal autonomy and tradition,
and it meant to make some inroads on the latter in favor of the
former.

But, apart from some general statements, nothing in the

7.

legislative history tells how Congress expected the balance to
be struck in particular cases under the equal protection provision
of the Act.
Turning to the case law under the Act, the court noted
that the equal protection provision has been held not to impose
precisely the same requirements as its Constitutional counterpart.
In particular, courts have upheld requirements that persons have
particular amounts of Indian blood to qualify for tribal membership
and office.

Thus, although the ordinance here would fall under

the Fourteenth Amendment, it does not necessarily fall under
§1302(8); for, "The interest of the Tribe in maintaining its
integrity and in retaining its tribal cultures is entitled to
due consideration. [cite] And where the tribal tradition is deepseated and the individual injury is relatively insignificant,
courts should be and have been reluctant to order the tribal
authority to give way."

Nonetheless, cases under the Fourteenth

Amendment provide at least a starting point for decision.
The difficulty in this case, CA 10 thought, is that the
policy reflected in the ordinance here "is of relatively recent
origin and so • • • does not merit the force that would be
attributable to a venerable tradition."

Moreover, there was evidence

that the ordinance was designed as an economic measure, to limit
the number of persons entitled to shares in tribal property and
income.

Granting the tribe's strong interest in preserving its

cultural identity, the ordinance does not further that goal because
it bars cultural Pueblos like Audrey from membership while admitting

persons who are not cultural Pueblos.

All things considered,

CA 10 thought, "the facts do not support a decision that the
Tribe's interest [in the ordinance] is compelling."
II. JURISDICTION.
Petrs' and amici' first argument is that the courts below
erred in holding that jurisdiction existed under §1343(4).
That statute grants jurisdiction over "any civil action authorized
by law [for relief] under any Act of Congress providing for
the protection of civil rights • • • "

The Indian

..

Act
one__ kind
of lawsuit.
..... authorizes only
........,.,_,
,_, --..........--...
~,._......-..

~ivil

-

Rights

25 U.S.C. §1303 provides:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be available to any person, in a court of the United States,
to test the legality of his detention by order of an
Indian tribe.
Thus, if a person were detained in violation of the provisions
of the Indian Civil Rights Act that protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures, 25 U.S.C. §1302(2), or double jeopardy,
§1302(3), or compulsory self-incrimination, §1302(4), or speedy
trial, §l302(6),or excessive bail, §1302(7), or jury trial,
IA~A411"'

ll3o3

§1302(10), he could bring an actionAto vindicate those rights.
But no other section in the Act authorizes suit, so that the
other rights declared by §1302 cannot be vindicated by suit under
§1343(4).
In addition, a right of action to vindicate those rights
should not be implied.

First, Congress has provided a remedy

for vindication of some §1302 rights in §1303, and that remedy
by implication is exclusive.

Second, Congress rejected proposals

9.

that would have authorized appeals from convictions in tribal
courts to federal court, and that would have empowered the
Attorney General to bring criminal and civil actions to vindicate
denials of constitutional rights by tribes.

Obviously, Congress

meant to limit judicial intrusion into the affairs of Indian
tribes.
Senator

Finally, in hearings held after the Act became law,
!rv~n,

the

p~me m~~e:_~~ind ~e

Act, stated:

This bill does not provide for the ;;deral courts to
~
l review
all the decisions of the Indian courts. In fact ,
provision for Federal review was in there originally, and

~

at the request of a number of tribes we eliminated that
entirely. The only provision in this bill that provides
for Federal court interference is writ of habeas corpus,
and that probably exists as law now • • •

~

This statement confirms the argument that §1303 was intended
to be the exclusive remedy for the rights guaranteed in §1302.

_a_~ight_of ~ ~
ac~n~~.!::...,~pl~~..!~IE....:._h~s._?f §2102. First, 1-D ~
Resps and amicus United States reply that

Congress' evident intent was to protect the rights that it declared
in §1302.

The habeas corpus remedy of §1303 provides relief only

in a limited number of circumstances, and would be ineffective
in protecting such rights as freedom of religion, freedom of
the press, and due process, where physical detention was not
imposed.

Moreover, the

Sen!~e ~e¥o~t

on the Act discussed
of jurisdiction
a series of cases in which federal courts had denied/remedies

or want

for violations of constitutional rights by Indian tribes, including
one dispute over tribal membership. S.Rep.No.841, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9-10 (1967), discussing Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe,
249 F.2d 915 (CA 10 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960.

The

intent of Congress must have been to supply a remedy in such
cases.
The United States refines this argument, contending that
the

g~

of Cort v. Ash, 422

u.s.

66 (1975) for deciding

whether to imply a right of action are satisfied.

First,

resps are members "of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," 422 U.S., at 78, for they are full-blooded
Indians who have lived on the Pueblo reservation all their lives.
Second, although the legislative history is quite sketchy as
to Congress' intent in this regard, "the intention to provide
[a remedy] seems implicit in the statute's language and its
purpose." Third, a private remedy would be "consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme," 422
at 78, for no other remedy is available.

u.s.,

Finally, this is not

a cause of action "traditionally relegated to state law," for
absent congressional authorization, the States have no jurisdiction
over Indian tribes.
Petrs' reliance on Senator Ervin's remarks is misplaced. First,
those remarks appear aimed only at the provision in the original
bill that would have authorized an appeal from tribal courts to
federal courts in criminal cases, which was, as he said, deleted
from the final version.

Second, because the remarks came after

the bill was enacted, they cannot carry much weight.
Finally, all,...,-.-P"..,.
four circuits
....,., ...,.... that have considered whether
private suits to vindicate §1302 rights may be brought under
§1343(4) jurisdiction have concluded that they can, although at

least one district court thinks otherwise. See cases cited
to Brief for United States at 21-22 n.l9.
Petrs reply to all this by arguing that resps are not
without a remedy because the Act remains enforceable in tribal
courts and because the Secretary of the Interior has the power
to disapprove tribal ordinances that are inconsistent with the
Act.

Petrs do not claim, however, that either of these remedies

is open to resps at the present time.
DISCUSSION: I believe I would follow the four courts of
appeals that have implied a right of action from §1302.

I find

it hard to believe that Congress would have declared all those
fine sounding rights without meaning to make them enforceable
at the instance of one who is denied them.

The Court has followed

this course under a number of other civil rights statutes that
do not explicitly authorize private actions.

E.g., Johnson v.

Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975)(right of action under
42 U.S.C. §1981);

Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)

(right of action under 42 U.S.C. §1982); Allen v. State Board
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)(right of action under §5 of
Voting Rights Act of 1965). I would not place dispositive weight
on Congress' enactment of the §1303 habeas remedy, because that
section seems to me simply a counterpart to the various other
criminal-process rights enumerated in §1302.

I do not think

either side can draw much comfort from the legislative history.
The strongest argument against implying a cause of action
is that federal courts traditionally have not had jurisdiction over

tribal affairs and that Congress' intent . to change that should
be expressed more clearly than it is here.

Because this argument

is more relevant to the question whether the tribe's sovereign
immunity has been waived by the Act, I consider it in the next
section.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
Petrs and their amici contend that this Court long has
held Indian tribes are immune from suit except to the extent that
Congress has expressly waived immunity.

E.g., Puyallup Tribe,

Inc. v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 45 U.S.L.W. 4837, 4839 (1977);
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S.
506, 512 (1940).

No such explicit waiver can be found here,

as resps' own argument in favor of implying a cause of action
demonstrates.
Resp replies first, that the committee report and hearings
accompanying the Act show Congress clearly was aware that Indian
tribes cannot be sued without a congressional waiver of sovereign
immunityo

What is more important, resps argue, is that petrs

do not distinguish between suits for injunctions and suits for
damages.

While it may be true that an express waiver of sovereign

immunity is required before a suit for damages can be brought,
suits for injunctive relief traditionally have been allowed against
the sovereign by letting plaintiffs use the fiction of suing the
sovereign's agent,

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), even though

sovereign immunity has not been waived.

In this case, the governor

of the Pueblo - the chief executive officer of the tribe - is
a named defendant, as well as the tribe itself.
relief sought is equitable.

And the only

Therefore, this Court should apply

the doctrine of Ex parte Young here.

In fact, it should go a

step further, and allow the tribe itself to be named as a defendant
in a suit for injunctive relief, because

E~

parte Young is, after

all, just a convenient fiction anyway.
The United States takes about the same line as resps, except
that it does not insist that the tribe can be made a named party.
a tribe's
All the cases relied on by petrs for the proposition that/sovereign
immunity must be waived explicitly involve suits for damages, and
so are distinguishable.

In a footnote, the United States notes

that the tribal constitution vests the power to determine the
membership status of children of mixed marriages in the tribal
council, which was not named as a party.

Thus, the Court might

deem it necessary to add the council as a party defendant pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 21.

But, in the United States' opinion this

is not necessary, because the relief sought was only an injunction
against enforcement of the ordinance, and not admission to the tribe.
This relief can be granted against the governor himself, as chief
enforcement officer of the tribe.
Petrs answer these arguments by contending that there is
no logical justification for holding, in effect, that immunity
is waived to suits for injunctive relief but not for damages.
Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity of Indian tribes serves

both to recognize the special status of Indian tribes as conquered
nations, and to protect the tribes' financial existence.

But

the tribes' financial existence will be threatened if resps' or
the United States' position is accepted, because the cost of
defending against suits for injunctive relief will be crippling.
In addition, the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be given
special deference where, as here, the suit challenges the tribe's
right to determine its own membership, because that right is the
very essence of sovereignty.
DISCUSSION.

Resps appear to have retreated from their

position in the CA, which the CA accepted, that the Indian
Civil Rights Act works as a waiver of tribal immunity as well as
a grant of rights to individuals.

I think that what is on

everyone's mind is the possibility that future plaintiffs will
bring damage suits against Indian tribes under the Act, and no
one - petrs, resps, or United States - is willing to argue that
those should be allowed.

Because there apparently is no authority

against resps'and the United States' position, it seems to me that

I

Young has some merit.
to believe

Again, it is hard

some kind of remedy to be

available, and a finding of complete immunity would have the _ effect
of foreclosing all remedies.
The one thing that puzzles me is why resps argue that the tribe
itself should be able to be named as a defendant.

It may be that

resps cannot obtain all the relief they seek without that, but
as the United States points out, the only relief sought

an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, and not
admission to membership in the tribe.

If, as the United States

hints, resps should have named the members of the tribal council
as defendants in order to get all the relief they seek, resps have
no one but themselves to blame.

It was they, after all, who

convinced the CA that the Act waived immunity altogether; and it
is they who now have backed away from that position.

If, under

their current theory, they should have named members of the council
instead of the tribe as an entity, they are the ones who should ask
leave to amend their complaint.
I note that the theory now being urged apparently has not
been raised in the various courts of appeals that have found
individuals'
jurisdiction to hear/suits under §1302 and §1343(4). Those courts,
without much discussion, have concluded that the Act works as
a waiver of sovereign immunity and have allowed tribes to be made
named parties.

I doubt whether the spector of money damages, or

the theory of Ex parte Young, was raised in any of those cases.
My own inclination would be to hold that a suit for injunctive
relief can be brought to vindicate rights under the Act, without
~

_.. ._. , =-----~ .......---~

reaching the question of money damages.

...

~

To hold otherwise would

leave resps holding a set of rights without remedies just as
effectively as to hold that jurisdiction under §1343(4) did not
convincing
lie. Neither would I find/petrs' argument that sovereign immunity
should be accorded special respect where the tribe's membership
policies are challenged.

That argument suggests no way to distinguiSh

between suits under the Act challenging membership policies, and

16.

suits under the Act challenging other kinds of tribal policies.
The result of accepting the argument, I suspect, would be to
immunize a whole range of tribal policies from attack.

The

argument simply does not limit itself as petrs seem to think.
III. MERITS.
On the merits, there are disputes both as to the appropriate
"equal protection" standard to apply under §1302(8), and as to
the result of applying whatever standard is appropriate to this
set of facts.

The latter problem is complicated because the

parties cannot agree on what the facts are, and the CA apparently
took a different view of them from the DC.

This dispute serves

to demonstrate the difficulty of gearing results under §1302(8)
to particular tribes' traditions; although as will be seen,
the most sensible way of reading §1302(8) may require just such
inquiry.
)\.The most narrow view of the equal protection provision of
the Act is advanced by three amici and by petrs' reply brief.
The argument is that §1302(8) states that an Indian tribe shall
not deny "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws

...

II

The substitution of "its" for the Fourteenth

Amendment's "the" is said to imply that §1302(8) requires only
that tribal laws be applied to everyone in an evenhanded manner,
and not that the laws themselves be evenhanded.
Nat'l Tribal Chairmen's Ass'n at 19-20.

E.g., Brief for

This argument is buttressed

by reference to a statement in a committee print of the Senate
subcommittee, commenting on a version of the bill proposed by

17.

the Interior Department:
The Department of Interior's bill would, in effect,
impose upon the Indian governments the same restrictions
applicable presently to the Federal and State governments
with several notable exceptions, viz, the 15th Amendment,
certain procedural requirements or-the 5th, 6th, and 7th
amendments, and, in some resaects, the equal protection
requirement of the 14th amen ment.
Staff of Subcornrn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comrn.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Constitutional
Rights of the American Indian, at 25 (Cornrn. Print 1966)(emph. added).
Thus, the equal protection provision of §1302(8) was not intended
to be coextensive with that of the 14th Amendment.

Finally, amici

argue, a number of courts have suggested this is the correct
construction of §1302(8).
Resps and the United States reply that no such significance
can be attached to the use of "its laws" instead of "the laws"
in §1302(8).

Amicus' use of legislative history is misleading,

because the Interior Dept bill to which the committee print
referred only prohibited denial of equal protection to "members of
the tribe," which was changed to "persons" in the Act.

Thus,

although the Interior Dept bill was, as the committee print says,
narrower than the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act is not.

Moreover,

nowhere in the legislative history is there a suggestion that use
of "its" instead of "the" was thought to have any significance.
And

the only case that lends colorable support to amicus'

position actually went off on other grounds.

Crowe v. Eastern

Band of Cherokee Indians, 506 F.2d 1231, 1237 (CA 4 1974), quoted
in Brief for Nat'l Tribal Chai rmen's Ass'n at 20. Finally, the

18.

argument cannot be squared with Congress' apparent intent to
apply traditional equal protection notions to Indian tribes.
If Congress meant to require only equal application of tribal
laws, it surely would not have used the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which imports notions of equality of the laws

themselve~.

My own view is that this construction is attractive only
because it would enable courts to avoid evaluating claims that
Indian laws violate equal protection in light of traditional
Indian culture, which evaluation will be required under any
that might be
other standard/adopted. This is no small virtue, but the
legislative history lends little support for it.

The problem

with the legislative history is that it concentrates on the
criminal-process guarantees of the Act, and says little about
the equal protection provision. However, as was pointed out
Congress did delete from the Act those

provision~,like

abov~,

the

establishment-of-religion clause, that it felt intruded too
deeply into tribal affairs; yet it retained the equal protection
provision.

That fact, together with the fact that Congress

chose to mirror the language of the Equal Protection Clause in
§1302(8), would incline me against holding that §1302(8) requires
only equal application of Indian laws that themselves would be
unreviewable.
B. The next position, pressed by petrs themselves, is
the
that/tribal law should be subjected to no more stringent test
than a determination of "whether there is any rational relation
between the 1939 Santa Clara Ordinance and the cultural and

19.

traditional values of the tribe."

Brief for Petrs at 27.

apparently are two branches to this argument.

There

First, Congress

and all the courts that have considered §1302(8) agree that it
must be applied in light of Indian traditions and culture.
order to insure that proper deference is paid to those

In

considera~ 

tions, courts should not apply conventional equal protection
analysis where "fundamental rights" or "suspect classes" are
involved.

Second, the discrimination claimed here is sex

discrimination, which the Court never has held is subject to
strict scrutiny.

Scoring an easy point, petrs complain that

CA 10 erred in finding the tribe's interests in the ordinance
are not "compelling."
Under this test - or, indeed, any stricter test - CA 10
erred in reversing the DC.

It ignored the testimony of the

governor of the Pueblo, who stated what the effects would be
if the ordinance were overturned:
It would tend to destroy the Pueblo as a whole • • • •
Without it we would have an influx of people that
we don't know who they are. They would come in from
all directions; Indians and non-Indians alike. So it
would be a destruction on the Santa Clara Indian
culture.
Brief for Petrs at 28.

d6

In a similar vein, a retired professor

anthropology and expert on Pueblo culture testified:
Well, because of the importance of men in connection
with the carrying on of the culture, the training of
the children in the socio-religious situation, the
culture eventually would break down and be lost.

Id. at 28-29.

Resps introduced no expert evidence to contradict
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this testimony, which the DC evidently accepted.

The CA should

not have reversed because it thought the Pueblo culture could
survive without the ordinance.
C. Resps and the United States reply that conventional
equal protection analysis should be applied under §1302(8),
albeit with "special weight • • • given to Indian values in
determining whether a particular tribal action meets the
established equal protection standard that is applicable • • • "
Brief for United States at 35.

In this case, the ordinance

discriminates on the basis of sex because it bars women, but
not men, from passing homes and land to their children, and
it discourages women, but not men, from marrying outside the
tribe.

Under Craig v. Boren, 429

u.s.

190, 197 (1976),

"classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives."

And in this case, CA 10 correctly held

that this test is not met.

(The United States also suggests

that, "Since the ordinance deprives the children of Julia
Martinez of the political rights that come with membership in
the Pueblo, it may demand closer scrutiny as a discrimination
that impinges on fundamental rights"; but it does not pursue this
argument because it is confident of victory under

~raig

v. Boren.)

Resps make an elaborate argument to show that CA 10
correctly disregarded the DC's finding that "Santa Clara was
traditionally patrilineal and patrilocal - in other words,
that kinship, name and location of residence were expected to

follow the male rather than the female line." See Brief for
children
Resps at 45-49. Resps agree that Pueblo/take their father's
name, but not that ties of kinship or location are based
primarily on the male line.

Petrs' own anthropoligist

testified that kinship ties are bilateral to the father's and
mother's family, and the expert upon whom she relied has written
that, "The [Pueblo] household is partially extended to include
relatives on either the mother's or the father's side." Id. at 47.
As for the anthropologist's testimony that the Pueblo is
"patrilocal," that testimony directly contradicted the sources
upon which she relied. Id. at 48. Finally, the DC could not
safely rely on figures indicating that more women than men
moved from the Pueblo after entering mixed marriages, because
those figures must reflect the very discrimination of which
resps complain.
What all this means is that the DC's finding that the
ordinance, although "a break in tradition" in the sense that
no fixed rules had been imposed before, nonetheless was "rooted
in tradition," was clearly erroneous.

CA 10 correctly discerned

that the Pueblo's interest in maintaining

it~

culture was not served by the ordinance.

That ordinance bars

traditions and

from membership persons who are in the mainstream of the traditirn
and culture, and admits persons who are not.

The fact that

the Pueblo admitted children of marriages between women who
are members and men who are not from 193]: to 1939 demonstrates
that the ordinance is no part of traditional Pueblo culture.

22.

The United States takes a similar view of the evidence.
It concedes that if the testimony of the governor and the
anthropologist, quoted above, is "correct," then "the ordinance
would be substantially related to the achievement of an
important tribal objective and therefore might well be consistent
with the equal

pro~ection

clause of the Act , its discriminatory

impact on respondents notwithstanding." Brief for United States
at 39. But the CA was right in holding that the ordinance does
not serve the purposes claimed.

The ordinance cannot be

defended as necessary to preserve the tribe's economic resources,
for that objective could be served without discriminating.
And the anthropologist's testimony about the importance of
the father in passing on Pueblo traditions is belied by the
fact that the children in this case are fully assimilated into
Pueblo tradition and culture.

But, the United States adds,

a different conclusion might well be reached on different facts;
that is, if a tribe could show that its traditions really were
handed down from father to children.
In my view, this is where the case becomes hard.

I tend to

agree with resps and the United States that it would be simpler,
the
in one sense, to import/traditional equal protection framework
into the Indian Civil Rights Act and then to adjust for the
particular interests of tribes in maintaining their culture and
tradition.

That approach would have the advantage of drawing

on a body of law that already has been (more or less) worked out.
In addition, whatever adjustments that would have to be made

under resps' and the United States' approach for tribal
tradition and culture also would have to be made under petrs'
proposed "rational relation" test, because courts still would
have to identify the particular cultural or traditional interesm
to which tribal laws would have to be rationally related.
On the other hand, use of the rational relation test
might not require a court to delve as deeply into such matters.
In particular, I worry about cases where the tribal law could
be upheld only if the tribal interest were found to be
"compelling."

"'t -

That kind of determination, it seems to me,

puts a court in the position of judging the weight of tribal
interests in a way that a rational relation test would not; and,
as the evidentiary dispute in the instant case demonstrates,
courts are not very well equipped to make such judgments.
As I view the instant case, however, it presents a
slightly different problem.

Here everyone agrees that the

asserted tribal interests are important, and the argument is

------

--

over whether the means-end fit is good.
......._.

.

Although it is true

that CA 10 rode a little roughshod over the testimony of the
governor and the anthropologist on this point, I do not think
the DC relied on that testimony.

Its view simply was that the

membership provisions were not subject to the equal protection
provision of §1302(8), and that, I think, is wrong.

The

children in this case are living proof that the means-end fit
of the ordinance is not good, whatever the governor and the
anthropologist had to say. For that reason, I tend to doubt

whether the ordinance should pass muster under Craig v. Boren.
The question whether the ordinance would pass a rational
relation test is closer, because more women leave the Pueblo
after marrying non-members and because there is some evidence
that Pueblo traditions tend to be handed down th=ough
fathers, although they were not in this case.
My tentative conclusion would be to accept the United
States' position and to apply traditional equal protection

-----------

analysis with adjustment for uniquely tribal interests.
~

As

I read the cases in the courts of appeals, that is roughly the
solution toward which they have been groping.

Although I am

uncomfortable with the notion of the courts riding herd over
tribal laws, it seems inescapable that that is what Congress
mandated when it passed the Act.

If Congress had meant for

a lower standard of review to apply, it would have done well
to choose some formulation different from the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

It is a little difficult for me to see

how the Court could reach a result that would apply petrs'
rational relation standard in all cases, given the language of
§1302(8).
D. Petrs' last-gasp argument is that a tribe's determination
of who shall be members, like the nation's determination of
who should be citizens, should be immune from judicial reviewo
They point out that the Court upheld an immigration law in
Fiallo v. Bell, 430

u.s.

787 (1977) that granted preference to

illegitimate children of women who are citizens or resident

aliens, but not to illegitimate children o£ fathers in the same
position, on the theory that Congress retains plenary power
over immigration.

Similarly, petrs contend, a tribe should

retain plenary power over membership.
Resps and the United States reply that Indian tribes,
unlike the United States, do not possess complete sovereignty.
Here, Congress has decided that Indian sovereignty should be
limited by the provisions of §1302 (at least to the extent that
individuals can sue for injunctions).

Moreover, petrs' analogy

is imperfect because these resps are more like persons born
in the United States, who automatically become citizens,
than like immigrants.
Petrs do not seem to pursue this argument very vigorously,
and I would not be inclined to take it very seriously.
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Petitioners
On Wnt of Cert10ran to the
'
United States Court of Appeals
. M
al
for the Tenth Circuit.
Ju l1a artmez et .

v:

•[March - , 1978]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide whether a federal court may
pass on the validity of an Indian tribe's ordinance denying
membership to the children of certain female tribal members.
Petitioner Sa.nta Clara Pueblo is an Indian tribe that has
been in existence for over 600 years. Respondents, a female
member of the tribe and her daughter, brought suit in federal
court against the tribe and its Governor, petitioner Lucario
Padilla, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of a tribal or!Jinance denying membership in the
tribe to children of female members who marry outside the
tri6e, while ext::iidfng membership to chilaren of male inem])e;' who marry outside the tribe. Respondents claimed that
this rule discriminates on the basis of both sex and ancestry
in violation of Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
(ICRA) , 25 U. S. C. §§ 1301- 1303 (i~76) , whwh p; ovides in
relevant part that " [ n] o Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." !d. , § 1302 (8). 1
1 The Indian Civil Rights Act was initially passed by the Senate in
1967, 113 Cong. Rec. 35473 , as a separate bill containing six titles. S.
1843 , 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). It. was re-enacted by the Senate
in 1968 without change, 114 Cong. Rec. 5838, as an amendment to a
House-originated bill, H. R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), and was
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Title I of the ICRA does not expressly authorize the bringing of civil actions for declaratory or injunctive relief to
enforce its substantive provisions. The threshold issue in
this case is thus whether the Act may be interpreted to impliedly authorize such actions, against a tribe or its officers, in
the federal courts. For the reason.s set forth below, we hold
that the Act ca.nnot be so read.

1

I
Respondent Julia Martinez is a fullblooded member of the
Santa Clara Pueblo, and resides on the Santa Clara reservation in Northern New Mexico. In 1941 she married a Navajo
Indian with whom she has since had several children, including respondent Audrey Martinez. Two years before this marriage, the Pueblo passed the membership ordinance here at
issue, which bars admission of the Martinez chHdren to the
tribe because their father is not a Santa Claran. 2 Although
then approved by the House and signed into law by the President as
TiUe.s II through VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82
Stat. 77. Thi.ts, the first title of the ICRA was enacted as Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The six titles of the ICRA will be referred to
herein by their title numbers as they appearod in the version of S. 1843
passed by the Sena.te in 1967.
2 The ordinance, enacted by the Santa.'Clara Pueblo Council pursuant to
its legislative authority under the Constitution of the Pueblo, establishes
the following membership rules:
"1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa ClaTa Pueblo.
"2. That children born of marriages between male members of the
Santa Clara, Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
"3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo.
"4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo under any circumstances."
Respondents challenged only subparts (2) and (3) . By virtue of subparagraph (4), ,Julia Martinez' husband is precluded from joining the

76-682-0PINION
SANTA CLARA PUEBLO v. MARTINEZ

3

the children were raised on the reservation and continue to
reside there now that they are adults, as a result of their
exclusion from membership they may not vote in tribal elections or hold secular office in the tribe; moreover, they have
no right to remain on the reservation in the event of their
mother's death, or to inherit their mother's home or her possessory interests in the communal lands.
After unsuccessful efforts to persuade the tribe to change
the membership rule, respondents filed this lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico,
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. 3 Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the court lacked jurisdiction to decide intratribal controversies affecting matters of tribal self-government and sovereignty. The District Court rejected petitioners' contention,
finding that jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U. S. C.
§ 1343 ( 4) and 25 U. S. C. ~ 1302 (8). The court apparently
concluded, first, that the substantive provisions of Title I
impliedly authorized civil actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, and second, that the tribe was not immune from
such suit. 4 Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was denied.
402 F. Supp. 5 (NM 1975).
Pueblo and thereby Assuring the children's membership pursuant to subparagraph ( 1).
3 Respondent. Julia M11rtinez w11s certified to represent. a. class consisting of all women who a.re members of the Santa Clara. Pueblo and have
married men who are not members of the Pueblo, while Audrey Martinez
was certified as the class representative of all children born to marriages
between Santa Claran women and men who are not members of the Pueblo.
4 Section 1343 (4) gives the di:;trict courts "jurisdiction of any civil action
autho1'ized by law to be commenced by any person ... to secure equitable
or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights" (emphasis added). The District Court evidently believed
that jurisdiction could not exist under § 1343 (4) unless the ICRA did in
fact authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief in appropriate
cases. For purposes of this case, we need not, decide whether § 1343 (4)
jurisdiction ca.n be established merely by presenting a substantial questio1t
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Following a full trial, the District Court found for petitioners on the merits. While acknowledging the relatively
recent origin of the disputed rule, the District Court nevertheless found it to reflect traditional va1u~s of patna.rchy still
sign!Jicant m ihba1 lite. The couf£ ·recogmzed the vital impor'iance of responaents' interests, 5 but also determined that
membership niles were "no more or less than a mechanism of
social ... self-definition," and as such were basic to the tribe's
survival as a cultura-l and economic entity. !d., at 15.0 In
sustaining the ordinance's validity under the "equal protection clause" of the ICRA, 25 U.S. C. § 1302 (8), the District
Court concluded that the balance to be struck between these
competing interests was better left to the · judgment of the
Pueblo:
"[T]he equal protection guarantee of the Indian Civil
Rights Act should not be construed in a manner which
would require or authorize this Court to determine which
traditional values will promote cultural survival and
should therefore be preserved . . . . Such a determin~t
tion should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not
only because they can best decide what values.are important, but also beca.use they must live with the decisipn
every day ....
". . . To abrogate tribal decisions, particularly in the
delicate area ofmembership, for whatev.er 'good' reaso.ns,
concerning the availability of a. particulflr form of relief. Cf. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1948) (jm:isdlction under 28 U.S. C. § 1331). See
also United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 67-:-68
(1933) (Cardozo, J.).
·
r. The court found that "Audrey Martinez and many other children
similarly situated have been brought up on the Pueblo, speak the Tewa
language, participate in. its life, and are, culturally, for all practical purposes, Santa Claran Indians." 402 F.- Supp., at 18.
·
6 The San.ta Clara Pueblo is a relatively smaJl tribe.
Approximately
1200 members reside on the reservation; 150 members of the Pueblo live
elsewhere. In addition to tribal members, 150-200 nomnembers live , on
the reservation.

~-

.,; ,
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is to destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving
it."

!d., at 18-19.

On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld the District Court's determination that 28
U. S. C. § 1343 ( 4) provides a jurisdictional basis for actions
under Title I of the ICRA. 540 F. '2ll 1039, 1042 (CAlO
1976). It found that "since [the ICRA] was designed to
provide protection against tribal authority, the intention of
Congress to allow suits against the tribe was an essential aspect
[of the ICRA]. Otherwise, it would constitute a mere unenforceable declaration of principles." Ibid. The Court of
Appeals disagreed, however, with the District Court's ruling on
the merits. While recognizing that standards of analysis developed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause were not necessarily controlling in the interpretation of
this statute, the Court of Appeals apparently concluded that
because the classification was one based upon sex it was
presumptively invidious and could be sustained only if justified
by a compelling tribal interest. See 540 F. 2d, at 1047- 1048.
Because of the ordinance's recent vintage , and because in the
court's view the rule did not rationally identify those persons
who were emotionally and culturally Santa Clara.ns, the court
held that the tribe's interest in the ordinance was not substa.n tial e11ough to justify its discriminatory effect. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 431 U. S. 913 (1977) , and we now
reverse.
II
Indian tribes are 11 distinct, independent political communi·ties, retaining their original natural rights" in matters of
local self-government. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6
Pet.) 515, 559 ( 1832); see United States v. M azurie, 419 U. S.
544, 557 (1975); F. Cohen, Handbook on Federa.I Indian Law
122-123 (1941). Although no longer "possessed of the full
·~ttributes. of sovereignty," they remaiu a 11 separate peoplet

~···

'·'
'.

"'
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with the power of regulating their internal and social rela~
tions." United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381-382
(1886). See United States v. Wheeler,- U.S.- (1978).
They have power to make their own substantive law in inter~
nal matters, see Roff v. Burney, 168 U. S. 218 ( 1897) (mem~
bership); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899) (inheritance
rules); United States v. Quiver, 241 U. S. 602 ( 1916) (domes~
tic relations), a.nd to enforce that law in their own forums,
see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
As sepa.r ate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or sta.te authority. Thus, in 1'alton v. Mayes, 163 U. S.
376 ( 1896), this Court held that the Fifth Amendment did
not "operat[e] upon" "the powers of local self-government
enjoyed" by the tribes. Id., at 384. In ensuing years the
lower federal courts have extended the holding of Talton to
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the Four.teenth Amendment. 7
7 See, e. g., Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F. 2d 529, 533 (CAS 1967) (Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal
Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (CAlO 1959) (freedom of -religion under First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F. 2d 553
(CA8 1958), cert. denied, 358 U. S. 932 (1959) (Fourteenth Amendment). See also Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F. 2d 915, 919
(CAlO 1957), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 960 (1958) (applying Talton to Fifth
Amendment due process claim); Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F. 2d 674, 678
(CAlO 1971). But see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F. 2d 369 (CA9 1965)
and Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F . 2d 486 (CA9 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U. S. 903 (1970) , both holding tha.t where a tribal court was
so pervasively regulated by a federal agency that it was in effect a federal
in,stmment.ality, a writ of habC'as corpus would lie to a person detained by
that court in violation of the Constitntion.
The line of authority growing out of Talton, while exempting Indian
tribes from constitutional provisions addressed specifically to State or Federal Governments, of course does not. relieve State and Federal Governments
of their obligation · to individual Indians under these provisions.
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As the Court in Talton recognized, however, Congress has
plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of
local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess. 163
U. S., at 384. See, e. g., United States v. Kagama, supra, 118
U.S., a.t 379-381, 383-384; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187
U. S. 294, 305-307 (1902). Title I of the ICRA, 25 U. S. C.
§§ 1301-1303, represents an exercise of that authority. In
25 U. S. C. § 1302, Congress acted to modify the effect of
Talton and its progeny by imposing certain restrictions upon
tribal governments similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Section 1302 in its ent.irl'ty provides that:
"No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government. shall" ( 1) make or enforce any Jaw prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of t.he press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
"(2) violat-e the right of the people to be secure in t.heir persons, houses,
papers, an,d effects aga.inst. unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable ca.use, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the per::;on or thing to be
seized;
"(3) subject any person for t.he same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
" ( 4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
" ( 5) take a.ny private property for a public use without just compensation;
"(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted wit11 the witnesses against him, to ha.ve compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
"(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and
unusual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one
offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term
of six months or a fine of $500, or bot.h ;
"(8) deny to any person within it~> jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process
'Of Jaw;
"(9) pass any bill of a.tta.inder or ex post facto law; or
8
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In 25 U. S. C. § 1303, the only remedial provision expressly
supplied by Congress, the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" is made "available to any person, in a court of the United
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an
Indian tribe."
Petitioners concede that § 1302 modifies the substantive
law applicable to the tribe; they urge. however, that Congress
did not intend to authorize federal courts to review violations
of i ts provisions except as they might arise on habeas cor us.
)
They
e, urt er, t at Congress 1d not waive the tribe's
sovereign irrununity from suit. Respondents, on the other
hand, contend that § 1302 not only modifies the substantive
law applicable to the exercise of sovereign tribal powers, but
also authorizes civil suits for equitable relief against the tribe
and its officers in federal courts. We consider these contentions first with respect to the tribe.

III
Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the
common-law immunit from suit traditionall enjoyed by
soverm n Jowers. Turner v. nited tates, 248 U. .
, 58
(1919); Um e States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 309 U. S. 506, 512-513 ( 1940); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U. S. 165, 172-173 (1977).
This aspect of tribal sovereignty. like all others, is subject to
the superior and plenary control of Congress. But "without
congressional authorization," the "Indian Nations are exempt
"(10) deny to any person arcu~ed of an offense punishable by imprisonmPnt the right, upon t<>quest, t'O a. trial by jury of not less than six
persons."
Section 1301 is a definitional Hrction, which provides, inter alia, that the
"powers of self-governmrnt" shall include ''all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, legi~lative, executive and judicial, and a.Jl
offices, bodies, and tribunaiH by and through whirh they are executed ...•"
25 U,S,C. ~1301 (2) (1970) .
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from suit." United States v. United Sta.tes Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, at 512.
It is settled that. a waiver of sovereign immunity "'cannot
be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' " United
States v. Testan, 424 U . S. 392, 399 (1976). quoting, United
States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 (1969). Nothing on the face
of Title I of the ICRA purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or
declaratory relief. Moreover. since the respondent in a
habeas corpus action is the individual custodian of the prisoner, see, e. g., 28 U. S. C. ~ 2243, the provisions of § 1303
can hardly be read as a general waiver of the tribe's sovereign
immunity. In the absence here of any unequivocal expression of contrary legislative inteut. we conclude that suits
against the tribe under the ICRA are barred by its sovereign
im?n um ty1 rom smt .

IV
As an officer of the Pueblo, petitioner Lucario Padilla is
not protected by the t n be's immum£y from suit. See Puyallu p 2
1nc. v. Washmgton D ept. of Game, supra, 433 U. s.,
at 171-172; cf. Ex parte You·ng, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). We
must therefore determine whether the cause of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief asserted here by respondents,
though not expressly authorized by the statute, is nonetheless
implicit in its terms.
In addressing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that
providing a federal forum for issues arising under § 1302 constitutes an interference with tribal autonomy and self-government beyond that created by the change in substantive law
itself. Even in ma.tters involving commercial and domestic
relations, we have recognized that "subject[ing] a dispute
arising on the reservation among reservation Indians to a
forum other than the one they have established for them·selves," Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382, 387-388
(1976), may "undermine the authority of the tribal court[] ...

noe,

..

l
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and hence ... infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves." Williams v. Lee, supra, 358 U. S., a.t 223." A
fortiori, resolution in a foreign forum of intratribal disputes
of a more "public" character, such as the one in this case,
cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority. Although Congress clearly has power to
authorize civil actions against tribal officers, and has done
so with respect to habeas corpus relief in ~ 1303, a proper
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary
authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread
lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.
Cf. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 199'--200 (1975);
Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
With these considerations of "Indian sovereignty ... [as]
a backdrop against which the applicable ... federal sta,tute[]
must be read," McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Cornrnission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973), we turn now to those factors
of more general relevance in determmm whether a, cause f
action IS Imp ICI m a s a u ,e no expressly providing one. See
0 In, Fisher, we held tha.t a state court did not have jurisdiction over an
adoption proceeding in whicb all parties were members of an Indian tribe
and residents of the resPrva.tion. Rejecting the mother's argument that
denying her a.ccess to th0 Htatc courts constituted an impermissible racial
discriminat.ion , we reason0d t.lmt:
"The exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the
race of the plaintiff but m.thf'r from the quasi-sovereign st.atus of the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe und0r federal law ... [E]ven if a jurisdictional
holding occasiomilly results in denying an Indian plaintiff a. forum to which
a non-Indian has access, such dispara.te treatment of the Indian is justi.fied because it is intended to berwfit the class of which he is a member by
furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-government." /d., at
390--391.
In Williams v. Lee, supra, we held that a non-Indian merchant could
not invoke the jurisdiction of a state court to collect a. debt, owed by a
reservation Indian and arising out of the merchan,t's a.ct.ivities on the res·
ervation,, b.ut instead must seek relief exclusively through tribal remedies.

..
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Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 10 We note at the outset that
a central purpose of the ICRA and in particular of Title I
was to "secur[e] for the American Indian the broad constitutional tights afforded to other Americans," and thereby to
"protect individual Indians ftohl arbitrary and unjust actions
of tribal governments." S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 5-6 (1967). There is thus no doubt that respondents,
American Indians living on the Santa Clara reserva,tion, are
among the class for whose especial benefit this legislation was
enacted. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33,
39 (1916); see Cort v. Ash, supra, at 78. Moreover, we have
freguent~,r,ecognized the propriety of inferring a federal cause
of.!tction for the enforcement of civil rights, even when g ongress has spoken in purely declarative terms. See, e. g., Jones·
v. Alfred 11. M ayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,414 n. 13 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 238-240
(1969). See als~ivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). These precedents, however, are simply not
dispositive here. Not only are we unpersuaded that a judi1.o "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the rlass for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,'" Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39'
(1916) (emphasis supplied)-that is, d<>es the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintift"? Second, is there any indication of legislative·
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of
Railroad PaJ~sengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, fs
it consistent. with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme t.o
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securi~
ties Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975);
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relega.ted to state [or tribal] law, in an area basically the concern of the States [or tribes], so that it would be inappro-·
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Cort v. ..
Ash, supra, 422 U.S., at. 78.
See generally Note, Implication of Civil Remedies Under the' Indian CiviT
Jlifdlts: Act.,, 11>' Mich. L .. Rev. 210 (!976i)..
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<!ially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty is required
to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA, but to the contrary, the
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative history of Title I suggest that Congress' failure to urovide remedies other than habeas corp us was a deliberate one. See
Natwna
assenger orp. v. ational Assn. of R. R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Cart v. Ash, supra.

A
Two distinct and ~ompeting purposes are manifest in the
provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective . of
strengthening the position of individual tribal members
vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the wellestablished federal "policy of furthering Indian self-government." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974); see
Fisher v. District Court, supra, 424 U. S., at 391. 11 This commitment to the goal of tribal self-determination is demonstrated by the provisions of Title I itself. Section 1302,
rather than providing in wholesale fashion for the extension
of constitutional requirements to tribal governments, as had
been initially proposed,' 2 selectively incorporated and in some
11 One month before passage of the ICRA, President Johnson had urged
its enactment as part of a legislative and administrative program with the
overall goal of furthering "self-determination," "self-help," and "selfdevelopment" of Indian tribes. See 114 Cong. Rec. 5518, 5520 (1968) .
12
Exploratory hearin~~;s which led to the ICRA commenced in 1961,
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Itd9B4, Senator Ervin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, introduced S. 3041-3048, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., on which no hearings were had.
The bills were reintroduced in the 89th Congress as S. 961-968 and were
the subject of extensive hearings by the subcommittee. Hearings on
S. 961-968 and S. J. Res. 40 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)
[hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
S. 961 would have !'xtrnded to tribal governments all constitutional provisions applicable to the Federal Government. After criticism of this
proposal a.t the hearings, Congress instead adopted the approach found
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instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit
the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments.13 See n. 8, supra. Thus, for example, the statute.
does not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it
require jury trials in civil cases, or appointment of counsel for
indigents in criminal cases, cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 ( 1972) .14
The other titles of the ICRA also manifest a congressional
purpose to protect tribal sovereignty from undue interference. For instance, Title III, 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321-1326,
hailed by some of the ICRA's supporters as the most important part of the Act/ 5 provides that States may not assume
in a subst.itute bill submitted by the Interior Department., reprinted in
1965 Hearings, supra, at 318, which, with some changes in wording, was
enacted into law as 25 U. S. C. §§ 1302-1303. See also n. 1, supra.
13 See, e. g., Subcommittee on Constitutional Right,;, Senate .Tuclicia.ry
Committee, Constitutional Rights of the American, Indian: Summary
Report of Hearings and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res. 194, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., 8-11, 25 (Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as Summary
Report]; 1965 Hearings, supra, at 17, 21, 50 (statements of Solicitor of
the Dept. of Interior); id., at 65 (statement of Arthur Laza.rus, Counsel
for the Association of American Indian Affairs).
H The provision~ of § 1302, set forth fully in n. 8, supra, differ in language and in substance in ma.ny other respects from those contained ip. the
constitutional provisions on which they were modeled. The provisions of
the Second and Third Amendments, in addition to those of the Seventh
Amendment, were omitted entirely. The provision here at issue, § 1302
(8), differs from the constitutional Equal Protection Clause in that it
guarantees "the equal protection of its [the tribe's] laws," rather than
of "the laws." Moreover, § 1302 (7), which prohibits cruel or unusual
punishments and excessive ba.ils, sets an absolute limit of six rnonths
imprisonment and a $500 fine on penalties which a tribe may impose.
Finally, while most of the guarantees of t.he Fifth Amendment were
extended to tribal actions, it is interesting to note that § 1302 does not
require tribal criminal prosecutions to be initiated by grand jury indictment, which was the requirement. of the Fift.h Amendment specifically at
issue and found inapplicable to tribes in Talton v. Mayes, cliscussed, supra,
J>P· 6-7.
'.1~ See~ e. g., 114 Cong. Rec. 9596 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Meeds);

.
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civil or criminal jurisdiction over "Indian country" without
the prior consent of the tribe, thereby abrogating prior law to
the contrary. 16 Other titles of the ICRA provide for strengthening certain tribal courts through training of Indian judges,u
and for minimizing interference by the Federal Bureau of
Indian Affairs in triballitigation. 18
Where Congress seeks to promote dual objectives in a single
statute, courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer
from its silence a cause of action that, while serving one
legislative purpose, will disserve the other. Creation of a
federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights created
in Title 1, however useful it might. be in securing compliance
Hearings on the Rights of Members of the Indian Tribes before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior & Insular
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 (1968) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings). See also 1965 Hearings, supra, at 198 (remarks of Executive Director, NationiU. Congress cif American Indians).
u In 25 U. S. C. § 1323 (b), Congress expressly repealed § 7 of Pub. L.
83-280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953), which had authorized States to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservations without tribal consent.
17 Title II of the ICRA provides, inter alia, "for the establishing of
educational classes for the training of judges of courts of Indian offenses."'
25 U. S. C. § 1311 (4) (1970). Courts of Indian offenses were created by
the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs to administer criminal justice for·
those tribes lacking their own criminal courts. See generally W. Hagan,.
Indian Police and Judges 104-125 (1966).
18 Under 25 U. S. C. § 81, the Secreta,ry of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs a.re generally required to approve any contract made between a tribe and an attorney. At the exploratory hearings,
see n. 12, supra, it. became apparent that the Interior Department had'
engaged in inordinate delays in a.pproving such contracts and had thereby
hindered the tribes in defending and a.Bserting their legal rights. See, e. g., .
Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the American Indian before the·
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt.. I), 211 (1961) [hereinafter cit~d as 1961.
Hearings]; id. (Pt. II), 290, 341, 410. Title V of the ICRA, 25 U. S. C..
§ 1331, provides that t.he Department must act on applications for approval'.
of attorney dontmcts within 90 days of their submission or the application~
Wil.l b_e de¢~ed. tQ. have been granted,
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with § 1302, plainly would be at odds with the congressional
goal of protecting tribal self-government. Not only would it
undermine the authority of tribal forums, see pp. 9-10, supra,
but it would also impose serious financial burdens on already
11
financially disadvantaged" tribes. Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Senate Judiciary Committee, Constitutional
Rights of the American Indian: Summary Report of Hearings
and Investigations Pursuant to S. Res. 194, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., 12 (Comm. Print 1966) (hereinafter cited as Summa.r y Report) ? 0
Moreover, contrary to the reasoning of the court below, implication of a federal remedy in addition to habeas corpus
is not plainly required to give effect to Congress' objective of
extending constitutional norms to tribal self-govermnent.
Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the
ICRA, and § 1302 has the substa.ntial and intended effect of
changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply. 20
19 The cost. of civil litigation in fE.'deral district courts, in many instances
located far from the reservations, doubtless exceeds that in most tribal
forums. See generally I American Indian Policy Review Commission,
Final Report 160-166 (1977); M. Price, Law and the American Indian
154-160 (1973). And a became apparent in congressional hearings on
the ICRA, many of the poorer tribet:i with limit<'d resources and income
could ill afford to shoulder the burdens of defending federal lawsuits. See,
e. g., 1965 Hearing:;, sup1'a, at 131, 157; Summary Report, supra, at 12;
House Hearings, supra, a.t 69 (remarks of the Govern,or of the San Felipe
Pueblo) .
20 Prior to passage of the ICRA, Congress made detailed inquirie::; into the
extent to which tribal constitutions incorporated "Bill of Rights" gua.rantees, and the degree to which the tribal provisions differed from those
found in the Constitution. See, e. g., 1961 Hearings (Pt. I), supra, at 121,
166; id. (Pt. II) , 359; Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian before the Subcommittee on Con ·titutional Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Pt. IV), 823 (1963).
Both Senator Ervin , the ICRA's chief sponsor, and President Johnson, in
urging passage of the Act, explained the need for Title I on the ground
th~t few tribal con:stitutions included provisions of the Bill of Rights. See
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Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians. 21 Seei e. g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S.
382 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 V. S. 217 (1959). See also
Ex parteCrow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). Nonjudicial tribal
institutions have also been recognized as competent lawapplying·bodies. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544
(1975). 22 Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to disturb the balance between the dual statutory objectives which
Congress apparently struck in providing only for habeas corpus relief.
B
Our reluctance is strongly reinforced by the specific legislative history underlying 25 U. S. C. § 1303. · ' This history,
House Hearings, supra, at 131 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 114 Cong. Rec.
5520 (1968) (Message from the President).
21 There t~re 287 tribal governments in operation in the United Sta.tes,
of which 117 had operating t'ribal courts in 1973. I American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 5, 1963 (1977) . In 1973 these
courts handled approximately 70,000 cases. Id., at 163-164. Judgments
of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their juri::;diction, have been
regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other
courts. See, e. g., Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U. S. 100 (1855); Standley v.
Roberts, 59 F. 836, 845 (CA8 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 1999
(1896).
22 By the terms of its Constitution, adopted in 1935 and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior in a.ccordan.ce with the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 476, ]11dicial authority in the Santa Clara. Pueblo
is vested in its tribal council.
Many tribal constitutions adopted pmsuant to 28 U. S. C. § 476, though
not that of the Santa Clara Pneblo, include provisions requiring that triba.I
ordinances not be given effect until the Department. of Interior gives its
approval. See I American Indi:m Policy Review Commission, supra, at
187-188; 1961 Hea.rings (Pt. I), supra, at 95. In these in,stances, persons
:aggrieved by tribal laws may, in addition to pursuing tribal remedies, be
able to seek relief from the Department of Interior.

[
'•
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extending over more than three years,~ 3 indicates that Congress' provision for habeas corpus relief, and nothing more,
reflected a considered accommodation of the competing goals
of "preventiug injustices perpetrated by tribal governments,
on the one hand, a.nd, on the other, avoiding undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people." Summary Report, supra, at 11.
In settling on habeas corpus as the exclusive means for
federal court review of tribal criminal proceedings, Congress
opted for a less intrusive review mechauism than had been
initially proposed. Originally. the legislation would have
authorized de novo review in federal court of all convictions
obtained in tribal courts. 24 At hearings held on the proposed
legislation in 1965, however, it became clear that even those
in agreement with the general thrust of the review provisionto provide some form of judicial review of criminal proceedings in tribal courts-believed that de novo review would
impose unmanageable financial burdens on tribal governments
and needlessly displace tribal courts. ~ See Summary Report,
supra, at 12; Hearings on S. 961-968 and S. J. Res. 40 before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-23, 157, 162, 341342 (1965) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings). Moreover.,
2

23 See n. 12, supra.
Althougl1 C'xtensive hrarings on the ICRA were
held in the Senate, see id., Hous<' considerat.ion was rxtrrmrly abbrevillted.
See House Hearings, supra; 114 Cong. Bee . 9614-9615 (1968) (remarks
of Rep. Aspinall).
24 S. 962, 89th Cong., ht Sess. (1965), reprint.ed in 1965 Hearings, supra,
at 6-7. Seen. 12, supra.
2
~ There was also concern that de novo revirw would unduly burden the
federal district courts, and might prove too expensive for individual
defendants . Sumarry Report , supra, nt. 12. The former concern would
milit~te again:st inferring additional remedies under the Act ; moreover,
since the latter was at least matched by concern a.bout financial burdens
on the trib<'S, it doCI:i not provide support for the remedy sought by the
respon,dents here.
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tribal representatives argued that de novo review would
"deprive the tribal court of all jurisdiction in the event of an
appeal, thus having a harmful effect upon law enforcement
within the reservation," and urged instead that "decisions of
tribal courts ... be reviewed in the U. S. district courts upon
petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 1965 Hearings, supra,
at 79. After considering numerous alternatives for review of
tribal convictions, Congress apparently decided that review by
way of habeas corpus would adequately protect the individual
interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on
tribal governments.
Similarly, and of more direct import to the issue in this
case, Congress considered and rejected proposals for federal
review of alleged violations of the Act arising in a civil con.:
text. As initially introduced, the Act would have required
the Attorney General to "receive and investigate" complaints
relating to depriva.tions of an Indian's statutory or constitutional rights, and to bring "such criminal or other action as he
deems appropriate to vindicate and secure such right to· such
India.n." 26 Notwithstanding the screening effect this proposal would have had on frivo1ous or vexatious lawsuits, it was
bitterly opposed by several tribes. ·· The Crow Tribe representative stated that,
"This [bill] would in effect subject the tribal sovereignty
of self-government to the Federal government. . . . [B]y
its broad terms fit] would allow the Attorney General to
bring any kind of action as he deems: appropriate. By
this bill, any time a member of the tribe would not be
satisfied with an action by the [tribal] council, it would
allow them [sic] to file a complaint with the Attorney
General and subject the tribe to a multitude of investigations and threat of court action." 1965 Hearings, supra,.
at 235 (statement of Mr. Real Bird).
\lfJ

S. 9%3,, 89th

., !st Sess. (1965). Seen .. 12,

Con~
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In a similar vein, the Mescalero Apache Tribal Council argued
that "[i] f the perpetually dissatisfied individual Indian were
to be armed with legislation such as proposed in [this bill] he
could disrupt the whole of a tribal government." I d., at 343.
In response, this provision for suit by the Attorney General
was completely eliminated from the ICRA. At the same time,
Congress rejected a substitute proposed by the Interior Department that would have authorized the Department to adjudicate civil complaints concerning tribal actions, with review in
the district courts available from final decisions of the
agency. 27
Given this history, it is highly unlikely that Congress would
have intended a private cause of action for injunctive and
declaratory relief to be available in the federal courts to secure
enforcement of § 1302. Although the only committee report
on the ICRA in its final form, S. Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. ( 1967), sheds little additional light on this question,
The Interior Department substitute, reprinted in 1965 Hearings, supra,
at 318, provided in relevant part:
"Any action, other than a criminal action, taken by an Indian tribal
government which deprives any American Indian of a right. or freedom
established and protected by thk'> Act ma.y be rcviewrd by the Secretary of
the Interior upon his own motion or upon tho reque;;t of ::;aid IndiM. If
the Secretary determines that ~aid Indian ha;; been deprived of any such
right or freedom, he . ha II requirr t.hr Indian tribal government. to take
such corrective action a· he det>mR nPcessary. Any final decision of the
Secretary may be rPviewed by the UnitPd Stnte,; di~trict. court in the district
in which the action arose and ::;uch court shall have jurisdiction thereof."
In urging Congress to adopt this proposal, the Solicitor of Interior
specifically suggested that "Congrp:;,; has the power to givo to the courts
jurisdiction that they would rpquirr to review the actions of an Indian
tribal court," and that t.b e sub:stitute bill which the DPpartment proposed
"would actually confer on tlw di:,;trict courts the jurisdiction they require
to consider these prob!Pms." 19fi5 Hearings, supra, at 23-24. Congress'
failure to adopt this provision is noteworthy p!uticularly because it did
adopt the other portion of the IntPrior ,;ub::'tit.u te bill, which led to the
•cttrrpnt versiQIJ of§§ 1302 and 1303. Seo n. 12, 8Upra.
27

76-682-0PINION
SANTA CLARA PUEBLO v. MARTINEZ

20

it would hardly support a contrary conclusion. 2 s Indeed, its
description of the purpose of Title I, 20 as well as the floor
debates on the bill/" indi~a.te that . the ICRA was generally
understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions
only through the habeas corpus provisions of § 1303. 31
Respondents rely most hPavil)· on a rambling passagr in the Report
discussing Talton v. Mayes nnd itH progcn~·. sre n. 8, supra, some of which
a.rose in a civil context. S. Rep. No. 841, sup1'a, at 8-11. Although there
is some language suggesting· that Congrrss was concerned about. the unavailability of relief in federnl court, the Report nowhere states that Title I
would be enforceable in n cau:;e of action for decla,ratory or injunctive
relief, and the cited passage is fully consistent with the conclusion that
Congress intended only to modify the substance of the Jaw applicable
to Indian tribes, and to allow rnforrrment in federal court through habeas
corpus. The Report itself chnractcrizcd the import of it:; discussion as
follows:
"These cases illustrate the continued denial of specific constitutional
guarantees to litigants in tribnl court. proceedings, on the ground that the
tribal courts are quasi-sovereign entit.i rs to which general provisions in
the Constitution do not apply." !d .. nt 10.
29 The Report ::;tates: "The purpo;;e of Titlr I is to protect. individual
Indians from arbitrary and unjust n.ct.ions by tribal governments. This
is accomplished by placing certain limitHtions on an Indian tribe in the
exercise of its powers of self-government." It explain;, further that "[i]t
is hoped that Titlr II f25 U. S. C. § 1311] , requiring the Secreta.ry of
Interior to recommend a modPI rodr> fto govern thP ::tdministration of
justice] for all Indian tribeli, will implcmf'nt thr rffeet. of Title I." !d.,
at 6. (Although§ 1311 by its t.Pnm; refpr;; only to courts of Indian offenses,
seen. 17, supra, the 8Pnate Report. makl-s clPa.r that. the code is intended
to serve as a. model for use in all tribal romts. S. J1Pp . No. 90-841, at
6, 11.) Thus , it. appPar::; that thP commit1t'<' viPwf'(l § 1302 a;, enforceable
only on hn.beas corpus and in tribal forums.
30 Senator Ervin df'scribPd the moclf'l rodo provi::;ions of Title II, see
n . 29, supra, as "the prO]X'r vehic!P by which tlw objPctives" of Title I
should be achieved. 113 Cong. Rcc. Ia475 (1967). And Congressman
Reifel, one of the ICRA's chiPf supportpr:-; in the House, explained that
"by providing for a writ of habca:-; rorpm; from the Frderal court, the bill
would · assurp pffeetiv<' pnforcrmPnt of t.hrl:'c funclam<'ntal rights." 114Cong. Rec. 9553 (1968) .
31 Only a. few tribes hncl an opportunity to comment on the ICRA in
28
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This understanding is reflected in remarks made by the
ICRA's chief sponsor, Senator Ervin of North Carolina, one
year after its enactment. 32 Alm.ost immediately after the
Act's passage, legislation had been introduced to exempt the
Pueblos of the Southwest. including the Santa Clara Pueblo,
from the requirements of Title I. In responding to tribal
leaders supporting the proposed exemption, Senator Ervin
explained that Title I's provisions should not prove unduly
burdensome to tribal governments:
11
[The ICRA] does not provide for the Federal courts to
review all the decisions of the Indian courts. In fact,
provision for federal review was in there originally, and
at the request of a number of tribes we eliminated that
entirely. The only provision in [Title I] that provides
for Federal court interference is [the one authorizing
issuance of a] writ of habeas corpus . . . . If the man
was convicted in violation of a law, the Federa1 court
its final form, since the Hou;;e held only one day of hearings on the legislation. See n. 23, supra. The Pu('blo~ of New Mexico, testifying in
opposition to the provisions of Title I. argued that. the habeas corpus
provision of § 1303 "opens an avenue through which federal courts, lacking
knowledge of our tr::tditional value~, <'u:;tomti, and la.ws, could review and
offset the decisions of our tribal council::;." Hou::;e Hearings, supra, at 37.
It is inconceivable that., had the~· understood the bill implied!~· to authorize other actions, they would ha.ve remained ::;ilent., a::; they did, concerning
this possibility. It would hardly be consistrnt with "Lt]he overriding duty
of our Federal Government. t.o deal fairly with Indian:;," Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U. S. 199, 236 ( 1974), lightly t.o imply a cause of action on which the
tribes had no prior opportunity to prPsent their views.
32 Senator Ervin was not. only the nominal sponsor of the ICRA, but the
prime mover behind its enactment.. See n. 12, supra. At his prompt-i ng
the Senate commenced. exploratory hearings int.o the are<t in 1961, and in
three successive CongrE-sses he introduced legislation to address the problems that emerged in those hearings. He is credited by some as having
single-handedly secured pas.~ge of the bill by the force of his support for
it. See generally Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 "Indian
'Civil Rights"' Act, 9 Harv. J . Legis. 557, 574-602, 603 (1972).
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light of this finding, and given Congress' desire not to intrude
needlessly on tribal self-govemment. it is not surprising that
Congress chose at this stage to provide for federal review only
in habeas corpus proceedings.
By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal
remedies available to redress actions of federal and state officials, Congress may also have considered that resolution of
statutory issues under § 1302, a:nd particularly those issues
likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on
questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums
may be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts.
Our relations with the Indian tribes have "always been anomalous . . . and of a complex character." United States v.
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 381 ( 1886). Although we early rejected the notion that Indian tribes are "foreign states" for
jurisdictional purposes under Art. III, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), we have also recognized that the
tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government
structure, culture. and source of sovereignty are in many ways
foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and
state governments. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 ( 1884).
As is suggested by the District Court's opinion in this case,
see pp. 4-5, supra, efforts by the federal judiciary to a.pply the
statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as
a culturally and politically distinct. entity. 33
aa A tribe's right to define it ~ own member~hip for tribal purposes has
long been recognized as centra.l to its existence as an independent political
community. See Roff v. Burney, 168 U . S. 218 (1897): Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U . S. 76 (1906) . The legislat.ive history of t.he ICRA,
however, affords no basis for di stingui ~ hing between membership questions
and other issues in deciding whether a cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief is implicit in § 1302. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 841 , supra,
a.t 9- 10 ; 114 Cong. Rec., a.t 394 (1968) (remark::; of Sen. Ervin) . And
given the often vast gulf bctwee.n tribal tmdit.ions and those with which
federal courts are more intim:ttely familiar , t he judicia.r~· should not rush.
to create canses of action tba,t, would intrude on theRe deli cate matters.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE
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April 7, 1978

Re:

76-682 - Santa Clara Pueblo

I

v~,

Martinez

Dear Thurgood:
I join.

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

..
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 10, 1978

.

'

Re: No. 76-682, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
Dear Thurgood,
At the Conference discussion I expressed
a different reason why I thought the judgment in
this case should be reversed. I have decided,
however, that no souls would be saved by a concurring opinion on my part. Your opinion for the Court
is very persuasive, and I am glad to join it.
Sincerely yours,
r'~
\
l

Mr. Justice Marshall
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Copies to the Conference
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As we hav<' repeatedly emphasized, Congress' authority ove:r
Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts
in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their
members correspondingly restrained. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 553, 565 ( 1903). Congress retains authority
expressly to authorize civil actions for injunctive or other
relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the event that the
tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and enforcing
its substantive provisions. But unless and until Congress
makes clear its intention to permit the additional intrusion on
tribal sovereignt.y that adjudication of such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrain,ed to find that
§ 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly,

,.

,,

Reversed.
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